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IN THE SUPREME CO,URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARGARET C. SARTAIN
Plaintiff and Appellant

Case

-vs.'ri~~RNON

No. 9954

C. SARTAIN
Defendant an,d Respondent

RESP'ONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Complaint and counter-claim for divorce both based
on the grounds of mental cruelty.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
and e:nvarded defendant a divorce on his counter-claim.
The trial court further denied plaintiff's motion for a
new trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief the parties will be referred to as they
appeared in the trial court. The Statement of Facts as
given in the plaintiff's brief presents only that testimony which is most favorable to her position. Since the
case is equitable in nature and the court has the power
to review the evidence, there follows a statement and discussion of pertinent testimony necessary to complete a
review of the evidence in this case.
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Rupert,
Idaho on October 18, 1942 (R. 60). Four children were
born as issue of this marriage and the plaintiff had another daughter from a prior marriage who was adopted
by the defendant (R. 60). The parties had lived together
as man and wife for almost twenty years when this action for divorce was filed by the plaintiff. Defendant
counter-claimed and the trial court, sitting without a jury,
granted a judgment for divorce on defendant's counterclaim and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint (R. 158).
Testimony given at the trial shows that during the
course of the marriage, plaintiff had on several occasions
made major economic commitments for the family without first consulting defendant or obtaining his consent.
Plaintiff arranged for the purchase of a car in the fall of
1961 that did not contain the features which the defendant desired it to have (R. 135-136). This transaction
was completed by the plaintiff signing the defendant's
name to the contract (R. 136). Approximately a year
and a half prior to the institution of this action the
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff without consulting the defendant purchased a
lll'W ~tovp

(R. 136-137). The same is true of the purchase
of a n'frig-crator by the plaintiff (R. 137). Testimony was
al~o g-ivPn to show that plaintiff had incurred several
tleht~ without defendant's knowledge (R. 101, R. 137).
Plaintiff refused to have sexual relations with the
dPfPndnnt for several months prior to the time this action
for divorr(' was filed (R. 86, R. 142), and only sparingly
before then (R. 86}. This refusal existed even though det't'tHlant was desirous of having sexual relations and
attt>mptcd to overcome plaintiff's objections to sexual
rPiations hr acquiescing to her demands (R. 112, R. 127,
R. 142).

The plaintiff criticized the defendant in many ways
and ridiculed his idea.s (R. 143-144). Plaintiff refused to
let ddendant make an addition to the garage (R. 143144), or put in a garden behind the house (R. 73, R. 87-88,
H. 139). She insisted that he do the yard work even
though two teenage boys were available to do this work
and the defendant was working full time (R. 87-88, R.
139). Plaintiff's criticism of defendant even extended
to the point of being critical of the amount of food which
he ate together with claims that defendant was a glutton (R.141).
The trial of this case took only a. half day and a renew of the short transcript is recommended as there
Pxists a myriad of charges and counter charges too numerous to recite here.
3
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
THE DIVORCE TO DEFENDANT ON HIS
COUNTER-CLAIM.
After hearing the testimony, the trial judge felt
that the parties might be able to effect a reconciliation
and continued the case for three weeks to see if this was
possible (R. 154-155).
At the end of this period, it appeared that no reconciliation was possible (R. 156-157), and grounds for divorce existing, there was no reasonable alternative but to
grant a divorce. Gra.ziarno v. Grazia;no, 7 Utah 2nd 187,
321 Pac. 2nd 931. The trial judge gave the defendant a
divorce on his counter-claim and dismissed plaintiff's
complaint (R. 158).
The trial court in awarding the defendant the divorce entered its Findings of Fact and made the following statement in paragraph 7 of these findings:
''For a substantial period of time during the marriage, particularly during the last few months
thereof prior to the institution of this action,
plaintiff has treated the defendant cruelly, causing
him great mental distress by refusing to have sexual relations with him for several months imme.dia tely preceding the commencement of this
action; making major economic commitments for
the family without consulting with defendant and
obtaining his consent ; by constantly degrading
defendant and criticizing his ideas and views and
making him an object of ridicule in the eyes of the
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('hildren of the parties and has otherwise so treatPd the defendant that the legitimate objects of the
marriage have been destroyed and defendant is
entitled to a decree of divorce from plaintiff on his
counter-claim.'' (R. 36-37)

It is clear that the findings of the trial court state
grounds sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 30-3-1
(7) U.C.A. 1953, which requires a showing of cruelty
to the extent of causing great mental distress.
The record shows that the plaintiff failed to obtain
the consent of the defendant in the purchase of a stove
(R. 136-137) and a refrigerator (R. 37). She purchased
a ear without defendant being present and ignored his
wishes relating to certain features which he desired the
car to have (R. 135-136). She overruled his wishes with
respect to the purchase of the house (R. 138). There was
also testimony that plaintiff incurred debts on several
charge accounts without first consulting the defendant
(R. 137).
The plaintiff ridiculed the defendant for taking a
paper route (R. 62), and on occasion refused to give
him the car keys so that he could deliver his papers
(R. 82-84).
Both the plaintiff and defendant testified that the
plaintiff refused to let the defendant put a garden in
behind the house (R. 73, R. 87-88, R. 139). The defendant
testified that the plaintiff told him if he did put in a garden she would refuse to wash his clothes (R. 139). Plaintiff criticized the defendant for not keeping up the yard
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and told him that it was his duty even though he was
working full time and two teenage boys were available to
do this work (R. 87-88, R. 139). Plaintiff's criticism of
defendant extended even to the point of refusing him the
right to eat breakfast (R. 116, R. 140), and accusing him
of being a glutton and eating too much (R. 141).
Probably the most humiliating aspect of plaintiff's
treatment of defendant was her complete refusal to have
sexual relations with him for several months prior to the
time they separated and this action for divorce was instituted (R. 86, R. 142), and her general reluctance to have
relations prior to this period (R. 86).
Defendant's frustration and humiliation was heightened by plaintiff's demands that he gargle, brush his
teeth, and bathe before she would sleep with him followed
by a refusal to sleep with him even when he had complied
with these demands (R. 112, R. 127, R. 142).
Plaintiff's opinion of defendant which she expressed
to him on several occasions appeared to be one of general
contempt and ridicule (R. 143, R. 144).
See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 28 (1).
The effect that this treatment had upon defendant
was a welling up of frustration, humiliation, and disgust;
feelings which anybody under similar circumstances
would have felt.
In the case of Stevenson v. Stevenson,. 13 Utah 2nd
153, 369 Pac. 2nd, 923, this court in describing what con6
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~titutes

mental cruelty, pointed out that the determination to a laq.(P extent turns on the sensibility of the party
~ulrPring the cruelty. The following wording was used:
''What constitutes mental cruelty must be ascertained from the facts of each case. Whether defendant's conduct was cruel and whether it caused
plaintiff to suffer great mental distress can only
he <lctcrmined in light of the sensibility of this
particular plaintiff. Persons' sensibilities may
Yary due to their different degrees of intelligence,
refinement, delicacy of health, etc. For this reason the same conduct may constitute mental crueltv in one case and not in another. The overall
r{nswer depends not so much on defendant's conduct but rather on the effect such conduct had
upon the plaintiff.''
In this case the record clearly reflects the ridicule,
humiliation, and frustration felt by the defendant as a
result of plaintiff's conduct. There should be no question
but what the trial court had sufficient reason to award
a divorce to the defendant on the grounds of mental
cn1elty.
Although the discretion of the trial court in refusing
or granting a diYorce is subject to revision on appeal, the
general rule is that the trial court's judgment in this
n)spPrt \Yill not be reversed unless it is clearly shown
that its power has been improperly exercised. 27 A C.J.S.
Divoree § 194 (5); also Cttrry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2nd 198,
321 Pae. 2nd 939; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah
5i~i, 236 Pac. 2nd 1066; Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah
511, 212 Pae. 2nd 194.

7
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In the Curry case cited above, this court stated thu;
principle in the following language:
''The precept is well recognized that the trial
court is vested with broad equitable powers in divorce matters and that its judgment will not be
disturbed lightly nor at all unless the evidence
clearly preponderates against his findings, or there
has been a plain abuse of discretion or a manifest
injustice or inequity is wrought.''
Plaintiff's reliance on the old doctrine as stated in
the cases of Doe v. Doe (1916), 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781,
and Hyrup v. Hyrup (1926), 66 Utah 580, 245 Pac. 335,
that the husband must make a stronger case than the
wife in order to be entitled to a decree of divorce on the
grounds of mental cruelty does not appear to be fully
justified. This doctrine which comes from a more chivalrous age is based upon the theory that the woman is
more sensitive than the man and that she is not so well
able to take life's buffeting. .Alldredge v. .Alldredge, 119
Utah 504, 229 Pac. 2nd 681.
In the years since the Doe v. Doe and Hyrup v.
Hyrup cases this court appears to have moved away
from this doctrine. In the cases of Lundgren v. Lundgren
(1947), 112 Utah 31, 184 Pac. 2nd 670, and Wooley v.
Wooley (1948), 113 Utah 391, 195 Pac. 2nd 743, the court
acknowledged the existence of the doctrine but then
went on to support the decree of divorce for the husband
stating that there may have been circumstances seen by
the trial judge who was able to see the witnesses which
may have presented a stronger case for the husband.

8
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A more recent opinion dealing with the situation
wlwn' one party sues for divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty and the other party counter-claims on the
same grounds is Hendricks v. Hendricks (1953), 123 Utah
178, 2:J7 Pac. 2nd 366. In this case the trial court had
refused to grant a divorce to either the wife or the husband on the theory that both were guilty of cruel treatment. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the
trial court for further proceedings and in so doing used
the following language :
'' ... Our policy has been to take into consideration the practical exigencies of such situations
and in ca.ses such as the instant one, where both
are at fault, approve the granting of a divorce to
the one least to blame.''
Further in the opinion, the court made this statement :
''In view of the fact that neither spouse is accused of the commission of a felony, adultery, or
any other heinous offense, but the reciprocal
claims rest upon various acts and omissions, alleged to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial
court would be performing its function in the administration of justice by determining which party
was least at fault, granting a divorce and adjusting their rights giving due consideration to the
applicable factors outlined in our recent opinion
of McDonald v. McDonald.''
In the Hendricks case there was no mention of the
doctrine that the husband has the duty of presenting
a stronger case in order to be entitled to the divorce.

9
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO AWARD THE DIVORCE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
As was acknowledged in the trial court Findings of
Facts (R. 36), the defendant's conduct was not always
exemplary. It appears, however, that most of the conduct
complained of by the plaintiff was in response to plaintiff's treatment of defendant.
Defendant's use of strong language and flares of
temper were generally in response to encitement by the
plaintiff. Examples of this were when she refused to give
him the car keys so he could deliver his papers (R. 82-84);
when she refused to let him put in a garden (R. 73-74);
when she refused to have sexual relations (R. 71, R. 119);
her objections to his delivering papers to supplement
the family income (R. 63).
The accusations of unchastity by defendant were only
bitter insults incited by plaintiff's refusal to have sexual
relations with him and his frustration flowing from this
refusal (R. 119). This is shown in one instance by plaintiff's own testimony on pages 70-71 of the record.

'' Q. Immediately before we filed the complaint
in June of 1962, were there any incidents excuse me - that caused any particular difficulty between you and your husband~
A. Yes.
Q. What~
A. He says, 'Why won't you be my wife~'
10
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Q. \Vhen was this, and where was this?
A. This was on numerous occasions in the bedroom.
Q. All right.

Let's take a specific instance
when he made that statement. Then what was
said beyond that ~
A. He said, 'You must be getting it from somebody else because you won't give it to me.' "

It is possibly true that defendant did not bathe as
often as plaintiff desired but there is evidence to show
that he had never bathed more often than once a week
(H. 111).
The plaintiff has in Point III of her brief under Sections D and E listed several charges against the defendant some of which are true but many of which are not
or deserve amplification.
The radio referred to by plaintiff was used by the
defendant to awaken him for his paper route (R. 81).
(Appellant's brief, Point III, D-1.)
There was no showing that the paper route did not
make a profit only the plaintiff's assertion that she never
saw the money (R. 84). (Appellant's Brief, Point
III, D-4.)
Defendant did not refuse to buy the furniture desired
by plaintiff, but only insisted that he would like to save
his money so that he could pay cash (R. 75). The record
reflects that the defendant did supply the household necessities (R. 75). (Appellant's Brief, Point III, D-5.)
11
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The incidents where defendant struck his son were
both accidents (R. 100, R. 117, R. 118). (Appellant's
Brief, Point III, E-4.)
The effect on plaintiff of defendant's actions warrants some attention, particularly in light of the definition of mental cruelty set out in the case of Stevenson v.
Stevenson, 13 Utah 2nd 153, 369 Pac. 2nd 923. During the
incident where defendant drove a paring knife into a
wall and damaged the stove in a demonstration of anger
(R. 68), plaintiff's response was not one of horror or
shock as would be expected, but only concern for the loss
of the knife as seen in this excerpt of testimony on page
68 of the record :

"Q. Then what~
A. Then he walked into the - he was standing
in the doorway, and then he turned around
and grabbed a knife off the table and
slammed it into the wall and broke the blade.
I think he may have cut his hand. I don't
know. So I went into the front room because I didn't want to listen to him any
longer, and then he come into the doorway
between the front room and the kitchen, and
I said, 'You are going to have to buy me a
new paring knife. That cost thirty-nine cents.
Tax makes it forty-one.' I says, 'I need a
paring knife for all-around purposes, and I
am just fed up,' and he sat down to the kitchen table and started using foul and abusive
language.''
Plaintiff has not shown that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to grant her a divorce on the

12
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grounds of mental cruelty. The extent of the trial court's
discretion is shown in this statement taken from 27 A
C.J.S. Divorce Section 194 (7):
•'Unless the decree is palpably wrong or manifestly against the weight of the evidence or unless
the evidence in support of the decree is so slight
as to indicate an abuse of discretion a decree
granting or refusing a divorce will not, as a rule
be disturbed where the record amply supports the
decree, where the judgment is sustained by competent evidence, or where the evidence is conflicting.''
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL.
After the judgment was entered plaintiff moved for
a new trial (R. 43-44). This motion was based on the
grounds that the evidence was insufficient to justify the
judgment of the trial court, Rule 59 (a) (6), U.R.C.P., and
also that new evidence had been discovered which warranted a new trial. Rule 59 (a) (4) U.R.C.P.
Generally speaking, a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the
court may exercise considerable discretion in passing on
the application. Greco v. Gentile, 88 Utah 255, 53 Pac.
2d 1155; McMaster v. Salt Lake Transportation ComfWny, 108 Utah 207, 159 Pac. 2d 121; Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 Pac. 2d 701.
See also 66 C.J.S. New Trial§ 201 p. 484, et seq.
13
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With respect to the allegations that the evidence of
the trial was insufficient to justify the verdict, the gen~
eral rule is that a verdict will not be set aside on this
ground if the evidence substantially supports it. People
v. Swasey, 6 Utah 93,21 Pac. 400; Weber Basin Water
Conservarncy District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 Pac. 2d
730. The discussion of the facts in Point I in this brief
adequately shows that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to award a new trial on the grounds
of insufficiency of the evidence.
Rule 59 (a) ( 4) U.R.C.P. specifies that in order to
be entitled to a new trial by reason of newly discovered
evidence, the new evidence must be material and which
with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial.
It is plaintiff's position that a physical condition dis~
covered by her following the trial in April, 1963, affected
her desire and ability to have sexual relations with the
defendant. For this new evidence to be relevant, it must
be assumed that this condition substantially affected plain~
tiff's desire and ability for sexual relations during the
period of her refusal which existed for several months
prior to this action being filed in early June, 1962 (R. 86).
It must also be assumed that this condition could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial.
There is nowhere in the record evidence to support
either of these assumptions. If it was a physical condi~
tion which caused plaintiff's refusal to have sexual rela~
tions with the defendant, then surely she would have been
aware at the time that something was wrong. Yet, a year
14
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later at the trial, she testified that she refused to have
Hexual relations with the defendant because he smelled
'•like a goat" and she "just wasn't interested" ( R. 86).
Defendant testified that plaintiff gave him no reason except that he needed a bath, a condition which he corrected
but to no avail (R. 142). The position taken by plaintiff
that this condition could not have been discovered with
due diligence during the intervening year before the trial
iH without support in the record.

Even if it is assumed that plaintiff's refusal to have
sexual relations was due to this condition and the condition could not be discovered before the trial, there is
ample evidence other than plaintiff's refusal to have
sexual relations which supports the divorce for defendant. It is submitted that admission of this new evidence
would not affect the trial court's judgment, and for this
ieason it is not material.
When the trial court is faced with either granting or
denying a new trial by reason of newly discovered evidence, the following rule found in 66 C.J.S. New Trial
§ 201 (8) p. 500, et seq., is applicable:
''A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the granting or denying of a new trial applied for on this ground is
largely discretionary. The mere fact that a new
trial might have been granted does not mean that
the court abuses the discretion in denying it.''
See also W rilker Bank & Trust Company v. New York
Terminal Warehouse Company, 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 Pac.
:2d 626, and Fuller v. First Security Bank of Utah, supra.
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CONCLUSION
In reading the transcript of this case there is one
note which rises above the welter of recriminatory
charges and counter-charges. This is the feeling of despair and frustration felt by the defendant; feelings provoked by plaintiff's treatment which included rejection
in her refusal to sleep with defendant; humiliation
through ridicule of his ideas and feelings; and disregard
for his desires.
It is true that out of this despair and frustration, the
defendant sometimes exploded in a burst of anger and
disgust. It is from these incidents plaintiff has taken
most of the charges upon which her case is based.
There is adequate evidence to support the trial
court's judgment of divorce to defendant and the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. For this reason, there
exists no abuse of discretion and the judgment should
not be changed.
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial rests on the discovery of a physical condition which it is contended explains her refusal to have sexual relations with defendant over a year earlier. It is submitted that this condition should have been discovered during the year prior
to trial if it did affect her ability as contended.
The trial court's refusal to grant a new trial is within
its sound discretion and should not be overturned by this
court.
16
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'rhere was no abuse of discretion by the trial court
and its findings should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

B. L. DART, JR.
411 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defenda.nt
and Respondent
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